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Abstract: This paper provides quantitative and qualitative assessments of the
equalization impact on regional fiscal disparities of the current fiscal transfers system in
China. It also discusses the main problems with the design of transfers and the options for
their reform. In particular, by using provincial level data for the period 1995-2011 and
county level data for the period 1995-2005, we document the trends in own revenue
disparities across and within provinces and analyze how the different types of fiscal
transfers have affected these two types of disparities. The paper also examines how
expenditure disparities have translated into disparities in service provision and simulates
the additional amounts of funding needed from equalization grants to bring the less welloff provinces to the country average for service provision.
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1. Introduction
The most recent reform that has been undertaken by China’s central government in the
area of intergovernmental fiscal relations is the so-called “tax-sharing system” or TSS
reform in 1994, which largely reshaped the fiscal landscape in China by recentralizing
revenues while at the same time further decentralizing expenditure responsibilities. A
natural outcome of this reform in revenue and expenditure assignments---indeed one that
has been frequently and increasingly criticized---was the creation of large horizontal
fiscal disparities across subnational governments (Wong 1998, 2000; World Bank 2002;
Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2008; Zhao 2009; Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao 2011). These
disparities pose serious threats for the cohesion of the nation. For one thing, increasing
horizontal disparities in the allocation of fiscal resources is leading to inequitable fiscal
outcomes at the sub-national level; in particular, there is a lack of access to basic public
services by many residents in poor and rural local jurisdictions of China (Bahl 1999;
Uchimura and Jutting 2009; Jin and Sun 2011; Shen et al. 2012). In addition, from an
efficiency viewpoint, large disparities in the availability of public services lead to
economically inefficient migration patterns and geographical allocation of economic
resources; the increase in fiscal disparities has become an increasingly significant
obstacle to the country’s economic growth and political stability (Knight and Li 1999;
Bird and Wong 2005; Wang et al. 2000).
As a supplementary policy tool to potentially ameliorate regional fiscal disparities,
a formal intergovernmental fiscal transfer system was first established in the 1994 reform.
Despite the fact that the central government has been increasingly stepping up its efforts
to strengthen the role of the transfer system, most of the current studies reach the same
conclusion that fiscal disparities have remained high in the post-1994 era---indicating a
limited equalizing (if not anti-equalizing) effect of the system (Knight and Li 1999;
Ahmad et al. 2004; Dabla-Norris 2005; Tsui 2005; Heng 2008; Martinez-Vazquez et al.
2008; Zhao 2009; Huang and Chen 2012; Wang and Herd 2013). In particular, based on
relevant methods to decompose the sources of fiscal inequality indices, Tsui (2005),
Heng (2008) and Zhao (2009) find evidence that fiscal transfers from the central
government do not shrink but indeed widen fiscal disparities at both the county and
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provincial levels. In contrast, Huang and Chen (2012), Jin et al. (2013), and Wang and
Herd (2013) detect some equalizing elements of the system, though the overall equalizing
effect is limited---in large part due to the offsetting effects from different components of
the transfer system.
Nevertheless, the design of any system of transfers is a complex matter, and in
practice very few countries are able to get it right, especially when the decentralized
system of finance is still fairly new. In this paper we focus exclusively on the analysis of
the existing transfer system in China and aim to provide both quantitative and qualitative
assessments on the existing regional fiscal disparities and the overall equalization effect
of the transfers system. Our paper differs from previous studies in several important ways.
Specifically, we analyze the following: (a) the own revenue disparities across and within
provinces; (b) the equalizing/un-equalizing effects of fiscal transfers and its components
on revenue disparities across and within provinces; (c) how disparities in expenditure
finally translate into disparities in service provision; (d) how much additional funding
would be needed from the central government to bring the less well-off provinces to the
country average; and (e) the possible options for comprehensive reform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we first review the
basic setup of the current transfer system. In section 3 we use both provincial level data
for the period 1995-2011 and county level data for the period 1995-2005 to analyze the
existing regional disparities in fiscal resources and the equalization effect of the current
fiscal transfer system. In section 4, we summarize the main structural problems with the
current transfer system and propose some options for comprehensive reform of China’s
transfer system. The last section concludes.
2. A Brief Perspective on Intergovernmental Transfers in China
In 1994, the Chinese government implemented the TSS reform classifying all taxes into
three categories: central taxes, shared taxes, and local taxes between the central and local
government.2 Meanwhile, separate central and local tax bureaus were established at the
2

Central taxes include the tariff and tonnage tax, the consumption tax and VAT levied by the customs, the
consumption tax and income tax from enterprises that are subordinate to the central government, the
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provincial, city/prefecture, county, and township levels. The central tax bureau was put in
charge of collecting central taxes and most of the shared taxes, while the local tax
bureaus were made responsible for the collection of all local taxes.
In addition to rearranging revenue assignments between the central and local
governments, the TSS reform introduced for the first time in China rules-based
intergovernmental fiscal transfer programs with the objective of accommodating gaps in
fiscal capacity and expenditure needs across local jurisdictions.
However, after twenty years in operation, the new system of transfers has been only
partially successful at that objective. The limited equalization impact of the
intergovernmental transfers has been due in part to its initial design. As an important
example, which is further discussed below, the TSS reform introduced the “tax rebates”
as a “hold harmless” compensation for the richer provinces, which ended up being a
major component of the transfer system with persistent highly un-equalizing results. The
general-purpose equalization transfers later introduced in 1995 have only played a limited
role in offsetting existing fiscal disparities. Overall, intergovernmental transfers from the
center to the provinces are still not well developed. The situation is worse for transfers
from provincial to local governments where, in all these years, no transparent framework
has emerged. In what follows we take a closer look at the current transfer system at both
levels.

income taxes from rail transportation, state post, state-owned commercial banks, and head office of
insurance companies. Local taxes include the business tax and urban infrastructure tax (other than from the
headquarters of banks, and insurance companies, and rail transportation), the income tax from locally
owned enterprises, the urban land use tax, tax on occupation of arable land, VAT on land, the property tax
and inheritance tax, the contract tax, the motor-vehicle and ship use tax, the agriculture tax, the banquet tax,
the livestock slaughter tax, the farmland conversion tax, and the reorientation tax on capital construction.
Shared taxes include VAT (75% central; 25% local), the personal income tax and enterprise income tax
(50:50 in 2002; 60:40 from 2003), the urban infrastructure tax (rail transportation, headquarters of banks
and insurance companies 100% central, others 100% local), the resource tax (offshore 100% central and on
land, 100% local), and the stamp tax on security transactions (97% central; 3% local).
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2.1 Central-provincial transfers
Under the current setting, fiscal transfers from the central government to the provincial
governments can be broadly categorized into three main types:
(1) The tax rebate
The tax rebate, a compromised outcome to smooth the implementation of the TSS
reform, was introduced to guarantee the vested interests of provincial governments prior
to the reform. Its essence was to return to the provinces the amounts of VAT,
consumption taxes and income taxes that otherwise would have gone to these provinces
under the system existing prior to the reform. More specifically, the tax rebates on VAT
and consumption taxes considered 1993 as the base year and, beginning in 1994, all
provinces were guaranteed to receive at a minimum the VAT and consumption tax
revenues they had retained in 1993.3
In 2002, the corporate income taxes and personal income taxes became shared taxes
as opposed to local taxes, and so additional rebates on income taxes were introduced to
protect the vested interests of local governments. In particular, if the amount of income
tax revenues received by local governments under the new sharing scheme were to be
less than what they received in 2001, the central government was supposed to provide
additional income tax rebates to fill the gaps.
Although quite significant in absolute terms in the initial years, because the tax
rebates were determined on the basis of the nominal collections of the base year, the
relative importance of the income tax rebates, as was the case for the VAT and
consumption tax rebates, has been rapidly decreasing over time.
(2) The system of equalization transfers
Currently, the equalization system in China involves a number of formula and nonformula-based transfers, all of which have in common the general objective of reducing

3

See Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez (2003) for a more detailed description of the formula used in the
calculation of the rebate amount.
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horizontal fiscal disparities. And while over time the relative importance of transfers with
equalization objectives has grown steadily, that of tax rebates has continued to decline.
Transfers with an equalization objective include the following:
(a) The “transitory period transfers” (renamed “general-purpose grants” after
2001). This transfer represents the first formula-based transfer program introduced in
China, with an explicit equalization objective to reduce fiscal disparities across
provinces. The amount of the transfer is determined by a formula based on the
computation of a standard revenue and standard expenditure by the central authority.
Standard revenues are measured by using estimates of the tax bases and the standard tax
rate. Standard expenditures are calculated using a myriad of expenditure needs categories
including spending on administration services, public safety, education, urban
maintenance, social assistance, and heating. 4 Note that even though the origin of this
transfer can be traced back to 1995, just after the TSS reform, the general-purpose grant
was only first explicitly budgeted for in 2001. And it was only in 2012 that the Ministry
of Finance set up the current formal standardized approach to calculate the equalization
transfer. These changes have much improved the stability and transparency of this
category of transfers.
(b) The “pre-tax sharing system grants”. These grants are actually the contracted
fixed grants existing under the “contracted fiscal system” before the TSS reform in 1994.
These transfers have ensured that the “poor provinces” have total nominal revenues that
are not less than what they were in 1993. At the present time there are only about 16
provinces receiving these grants. Most of these provinces are in the central and western
regions of the country.
(c) The transfer to minority regions. This transfer was launched in 2000 with
RMB 1 billion to further support the development of minority regions. The pool of funds
is composed of two parts: the first part is financed directly from the central budget with a
yearly growth rate equaling the growth rate of centrally shared VAT revenues; 5 the
second part is 80% of the total amount of the yearly increase in collections for the central
government share of the VAT collected in minority regions.
4

The calculation method can be found in "The methods of the central to local equalization transfer in
2012", see http://yss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengceguizhang/201207/t20120725_669218.html.
5 Note that the base pool of these funds is RMB 1 billion in year 2000.
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(d) Transfers for increasing the wage standard of civil servants. These transfers
were designed to support provinces in the central and west regions of the country for the
implementation of policies mandated by the central government for increasing the wage
standard of civil servants. The main justification was that without this fiscal assistance
from the central government, many provinces in these regions would have faced serious
fiscal difficulties complying with the wage mandate.
(e) Transfer for the rural “Tax-for-Fee” reform 6 and the elimination of the
agriculture tax. The purpose of this transfer was to partially compensate local
governments for the revenue losses caused by the implementation of the rural “Tax-forFee” reform in the early 2000s and the complete abolition of the agriculture tax in 2006.
(f) Other general-purpose transfers with an equalization objective. These include,
among others, transfers to cities suffering from natural resource exhaustion, transfers for
the replacement of the local market place management fee and the industry and
commercial entity fee, transfers for supporting the Oil Tax and Fee Reform, and transfers
for regions with important ecological functions.
(3) Earmarked specific transfers
As of 2013 there were 220 specific-purpose grants. The plans are that one third of these
programs will be cut in the 2014 budget. Earmarked specific transfers typically
involve the central government response to high-priority emergencies or are generally
associated with particular programmatic objectives; some examples include fiscal
stimulus packages, bail-outs of local government social protection programs, or the
“compulsory education transfer” introduced in support of the rural compulsory education
program.

6

See Lin and Liu (2007) for a detailed description of the reform, and Wang and Zhao (2012), Alm and Liu
(2013) for an analysis on its potential impacts.
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2.2 Transfers below the provincial level
The 1994 TSS reform is generally perceived as an incomplete reform because it formally
regulated only the intergovernmental fiscal relations between the central and provincial
governments, leaving ample discretion for provincial governments to set up their own
fiscal relations with their local (sub-provincial) governments. For this reason, fiscal
arrangement schemes at the sub-provincial level vary from province to province (Shen et
al. 2012). In general, however, these sub-provincial arrangements follow the basic setup
of the center-provincial system and fiscal transfers there can also be loosely categorized
into three groups: tax rebates, equalization transfers, and ad hoc transfers. But generally
speaking the sub-provincial transfer systems are less well developed and their main focus
is still the pre-TSS reform practice of filling the gaps between current revenues and
expenditures.7
3. Equalization Impact of the Current Transfer System
3.1 Horizontal revenue disparities across and within provinces
China’s intergovernmental finance system has been characterized by persistent horizontal
fiscal disparities across provinces and within provinces, especially when the focus is on
those tax revenues fully assigned to the sub-national governments. Here we review the
trends in these fiscal disparities across and within provinces.8
Horizontal disparities in own revenue across provinces: Revenue assignments generate
pronounced fiscal disparities across provinces, especially for the very distinct eastern
region—relatively rich, and the central and western regions—relatively poorer. Over time
these disparities have not become less pronounced. In fact, after the 1994 TSS reform,
horizontal regional disparities in sub-national own revenues deteriorated (Table 1). A

7

For more detailed discussions of the sub-provincial fiscal system in China, see Wong (1994) and MOF
(2006).
8
Where there are differences in the level of economic development, there are differences in fiscal capacity
and these differences are naturally enhanced with higher levels of tax autonomy. Most countries deals with
this issue by strengthening the equalization grant system.
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Table 1. Real Per Capita Disparities in Own Revenue across Provinces: 1986-2011
Year
Mean
C.V.
Min
Max
1986
136.6
1.51
29.4
1063.3
1987
133.2
1.34
30.2
913.4
1988
116.4
1.18
37.6
720.0
1989
111.9
1.07
37.3
634.4
1990
110.7
1.04
38.6
604.8
1991
116.1
0.92
42.8
541.1
1992
112.9
0.90
44.7
518.1
1993
129.5
0.84
51.1
561.3
1994
74.2
0.90
27.4
326.1
1995
80.8
0.86
26.9
329.6
1996
93.7
0.88
31.6
384.5
1997
101.1
0.93
34.0
431.8
1998
118.9
0.95
39.2
492.1
1999
134.5
0.99
44.3
555.2
2000
149.5
1.04
48.2
725.2
2001
184.3
1.17
56.1
1060.9
2002
202.6
1.21
62.2
1197.7
2003
232.2
1.25
70.1
1427.6
2004
265.6
1.24
80.1
1575.0
2005
334.1
1.28
101.5
2109.2
2006
397.3
1.25
117.2
2532.7
2007
484.3
1.25
146.6
3071.7
2008
552.2
1.23
164.1
3531.8
2009
630.4
1.24
192.4
4124.0
2010
733.8
1.16
232.2
4611.7
2011
895.5
1.11
291.3
5473.1
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and Authors' Calculation

significant contributing factor has been the different rates of economic growth in the
different regions. Over time the coefficient of variation for per capita own revenues
increased reaching a peak in 2005 of 1.28 and slightly declining in more recent years.
These horizontal disparities are also reflected in the ratio of the maximum to minimum
own revenues per capita across provinces. This ratio stood at 11-fold in 1993 just before
the TSS reform and reached a peak in 2005 of 20-fold; in recent years the ratio has
decreased only slightly, still standing at 18-fold in 2011.
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Own revenue disparities within the provinces: Two types of factors influence fiscal
disparities within the provinces. First, an important feature of China’s intergovernmental
finance system is that provinces have almost complete discretion to design the revenue
assignments they implement for their sub-provincial governments. And in fact revenue
assignments within each province can be quite different. Second, there are often
significant differences in the levels of economic development and therefore tax bases
across jurisdictions within the provinces. Having a strongly hierarchically vertical
government structure potentially compromises the effectiveness of national equalization
policies in China. Final equalization outcomes clearly also depend on the equalization
policies implemented by the provincial governments.
Table 2 shows the disparities in own revenues per capita across counties within
each province from 1995 to 2011. The figures clearly indicate significant levels of
disparity within provinces, which vary over time and with trends that differ significantly
across provinces. While within-province disparities have declined in the eastern region,
which, again, comprises the richest provinces in China, the trends in other regions have
been oscillating or have increased quite significantly as in the cases of the northwest and
southwest regions. On average, the coefficient of variation for per capita own revenues
within provinces only changed slightly over the observed period; it increased from 1.1 in
1995 to a value around 1.3 in 2005, and then declined to a value around 1.0 by 2011.
Even so, as shown in Figure 1, own revenue disparities within provinces have become
less pronounced across different provinces over the period 1995-2011; the provinces with
the highest initial levels of disparities in own revenue registered the largest drops, while
the provinces with low initial levels of disparities in own revenue generally experienced
an increase in within-province disparities. This point is consistent with what was found in
Wang and Herd (2013).
It thus appears that if the central government cares about reducing horizontal
fiscal disparities, then central government policies need to take into account the existing
horizontal fiscal disparities within the provinces and to consider the best way to do that
given China’s strong hierarchical vertical structure of government.
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Table 2. Per Capita Own Revenue Disparities within Provinces: 1995-2011
Mean
C.V.
Min
Max
1995 2005 2011 1995 2005 2011 1995 2005 2011 1995
2005
2011
Beijing
367 3030 8586 0.6
0.5
0.6
18
1010 2889 741
6092 20516
Tianjin
793 1368 6410 2.8
0.6
0.7
125
526 1834 9954 2906 14893
Hebei
132
599 1012 1.8
3.2
0.9
33
37
154 2521 20445 6393
Shanxi
132
413 1716 0.6
0.7
0.8
24
56
209
470
1562
5649
Mongolia
150 1104 4107 1.1
1.1
1.6
37
93
167 1537 5312 40509
Liaoning
266
720 3191 2.6
1.7
0.5
46
76
692 6870 11696 7472
Jilin
97
272 1519 0.7
0.6
0.5
29
83
336
348
1036
3500
Heilongjiang 155
299 1113 1.3
2.0
1.3
49
41
170 1784 4957 10691
Shanghai
907 6596 8302 0.7
0.4
0.8
396 2749 3443 3215 11245 30694
Jiangsu
156 1707 5441 0.7
1.3
0.9
37
128 1451 456 15980 27655
Zhejiang
273 2149 3636 2.3
1.5
0.6
46
320
918 4355 26499 10909
Anhui
108
268 1267 0.4
0.8
0.8
48
41
164
335
1377
4879
Fujian
210
863 1788 0.5
1.7
0.7
88
144
607
710
9499
7548
Jiangxi
137
345 1546 0.9
0.4
0.6
40
104
326 1193
784
5886
Shandong
175
858 1965 2.2
1.8
0.8
36
109
410 3822 17022 7491
Henan
88
383
916
0.7
1.1
1
27
54
191
308
3576
4596
Hubei
94
303
952
0.5
1.1
0.7
31
53
148
273
2326
3614
Hunan
131
375
777
0.6
1.4
0.9
34
64
277
538
4110
5218
Guangdong
168
867 1144
1
2.6
0.9
32
58
168
878 21394 5577
Guangxi
114
335
775
0.5
1.9
0.9
24
65
182
349
6239
4208
Hainan
188
246 1567 0.6
0.7
0.7
69
24
610
588
765
4411
Chongqing
106
437 5219 0.9
0.9
0.4
41
83
2761 504
1654 10399
Sichuan
106
271 1047 0.7
1.2
0.9
5
40
141
486
1834
6395
Guizhou
76
285
842
0.7
1.1
0.7
22
69
199
375
2018
2865
Yunnan
156
340 1051 0.9
0.9
0.9
20
55
198
838
2117
8076
Shaanxi
86
410 1431 0.7
2.2
1.8
13
28
121
334
6117 14813
Gansu
102
218
951
1.1
1.5
2.2
8
19
98
582
2431 16330
Qinghai
124
326 1597 0.9
1.4
2.7
29
22
98
517
2121 25941
Ningxia
58
359 1899 0.8
0.8
1
6
39
138
176
790
6086
Xinjiang
160
536 2573 2.1
1.4
1.2
2
39
229 3029 6088 16840
Mean
194
876 2478 1.1
1.3
1
47
208
644 1603 6666 11335
Source: Ministry of Finance, China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy, and Authors’ Calculation

Own revenue disparities within vs. across provinces: In order to document the relative
importance of own revenue disparities within provinces and across provinces in
contributing to the overall revenue disparities in the nation, we calculate the Theil index
based on county data that provides a way to decompose the overall disparities into
disparities between groups and disparities within groups. As shown in Figure 2, revenue
disparities are starker within provinces than across provinces, suggesting that revenue
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Within province own revenue disparity, 1995

Figure 1. The Initial Level and Changes of Within Province Own Revenue Disparity
Note: changes in within-province own revenue disparity are calculated as the difference of coefficient of
variation of per capita county revenue within province for the years 2011 and 1995.
Source: Ministry of Finance and Authors’ Calculation

disparities within provinces are the main contributor to the overall revenue disparities in
the nation. This is related to the very different economic experience of counties within a
province. However, over the years, own revenue disparities across provinces experienced
a large increase from a value around 0.13 in 1995 to a value around 0.36 in 2008, while
own revenue disparities within provinces experienced a moderate decrease in this same
period. In summary, own revenue disparities are larger within provinces than across
provinces, but this difference has been diminishing over the years. The relative large
value of own revenue disparities within provinces has also dominated the trends of
overall own revenue disparities in the country.
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Figure 2. The Decomposition of Own Revenue Disparities, 1995-2011
Source: Ministry of Finance, China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy, and Authors’ Calculation

3.2 Relative equalizing effects of transfers
The transfer system reduces disparities across provinces but not enough: Here we
perform a simple exercise to analyze how the disparities in the prime initial disparities in
“own revenues” per capita evolve as we progressively and cumulatively add the other
financing sources in the system: first the tax rebates, second the ad hoc transfers, and
third the equalization grants. We also present side by side the distribution of expenditures
per capita. If the overall impact of transfers is equalizing, we should end with lower
disparities in the distributions of expenditures per capita than in the distribution for own
revenues, but the question remains how much smaller the disparities in expenditures per
capita should be. The results of the exercise are presented in Figure 3. Three things are
especially noticeable: (1) provincial disparities in own revenues increased after the 1994
TSS reform, something already noted; (2) the overall effects of transfers is equalizing
since provincial disparities in expenditures per capita are significantly lower than the

14
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Figure 3. Impact of Fiscal Transfers on Provincial Disparities in Revenues and
Expenditures
Note: Figures are calculated at real per capita term. Own revenue is added by tax rebate, ad hoc transfer,
and equalization transfer continuously. After the equalization transferred is added, it is equivalent to adding
own revenues to total transfers. Data for the decomposition of transfers at the provincial level are only
available up to 2004.
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and Ministry of Finance

disparities in own revenues per capita, results that confirm the recent similar findings in
Huang and Chen (2012), Jin et al. (2013), and Wang and Herd (2013). However, the final
distribution across provinces in expenditures per capita still shows considerable
disparities by international standards; (3) provincial disparities in both revenues and
expenditures per capita appear to have declined in the most recent years---a result that is
partially due to the increase of the share of the equalization transfers and the
corresponding decrease in the share of tax rebates in the overall transfer pool.
Equalization effectiveness of transfers differs significantly across the type of transfers:
As shown in Figure 3, the equalization effects of fiscal transfers vary across different
components of the transfer system. In general, as is to be expected, the tax rebates do not
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perform any equalization role but in fact lead to increased disparities across provinces in
the early years. As we already pointed out, the tax rebate was designed as a compromised
outcome to smooth the acceptance of the TSS reform by the richer provinces in 1994. On
the other hand, both the ad hoc transfers and the equalization transfers have contributed
to lower levels of regional disparities in available per capita resources. 9 In addition,
Figure 3 also shows that the equalization effect of those two types of transfers has
increased over the years, in large part due to the increased pool of funds dedicated by the
central government to these categories of transfers. Recall also that another significant
factor for the higher equalizing trend is the fact that the actual volume of the tax rebate
was fixed in nominal terms in 1994 and that therefore it has been decreasing in relative
importance over the years.
Practically all of the previous results have been at the central-provincial level and
this evidence should be interpreted as preliminary from simple descriptive analysis. In
order to analyze the equalizing and/or un-equalizing effects of the different components
of the transfer system more rigorously, we conduct empirical tests to examine the basic
relationship between different components of the transfers and the economic
development level of the jurisdiction (proxied by per capita GDP) at both the centralprovincial level and the provincial-county level. Given data limitations at the county
level, we are only able to decompose total transfers at this level into two categories, tax
rebates and all other transfers, which include the equalization transfers and ad hoc
transfers. We run a set of panel regressions with per capita transfers as the dependent
variable and per capita GDP as the main explanatory variable. In addition, we introduce
several other control variables that may affect the transfers received by the jurisdiction.
These include total population, the share of population residing in rural areas, the share of
public employees in the total population, and the lagged per capita fiscal deficit (defined
as the difference between per capita fiscal expenditures and per capita fiscal revenues). In
the estimations, we also include the province fixed effects and year fixed effects in order
9

While it is generally agreed in the literature that equalization transfers contribute to a lower level of
revenue disparities, the equalizing/un-equalizing effect of the ad hoc transfers is found to be mixed in the
previous studies (e.g. Heng 2008; Huang and Chen 2012).
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to control for the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and time-varying
characteristics.
An important concern in estimating the model is that of the potential endogeneity
of the economic development variable. This issue may arise due to the fact that
increasing the transfers received by local governments is indicative of more fiscal
resources available and at the discretion of local governments. Therefore, it is quite
possible that local governments may have used the transfers they received to promote
local economic development. To circumvent the endogeneity issue, we use an
instrumental variable approach. The instruments we use for the economic development
variable are the one-year and two-year lag in per capita GDP. This is justified in the way
that, by its nature, the lags in the economic development variable are correlated with the
variable at present, while the transfers received by a locality in the later years should
virtually have no significant impact on the economic development level in the past.
Finally, we also correct for the potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by
reporting the Newey-West standard errors in the estimations.
The regression results are presented in Table 3. As expected, the coefficient for
per capita GDP is positive and statistically significant in the regressions for tax rebates
(columns (1) and (4)). Thus, it confirms the un-equalizing nature of tax rebates at both
the central-provincial level and provincial-county level---better-off provinces/counties
receive more per capita tax rebates. However, the coefficient for per capita GDP is
negative and significant in the regression for all other transfers (columns (2), (3), and
(5)), which again is consistent with what we concluded above that both equalization
transfers and ad hoc transfers are somewhat equalizing. Nevertheless, the marginal unequalizing effect of the tax rebates is relatively larger and it overwhelms the marginal
equalizing effect of other transfers.
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Table 3. Determinants of different components of transfers
Central-Provincial Transfers
Provincial-County Transfers
Tax rebate Equalization
Ad hoc
Tax rebate
Equalization
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
and (5)
others
GDP per capita

Share of rural
population
Share of public
employee/pop
Lag fiscal deficit
per capita

0.036***
(7.020)
0.002
(0.642)
0.772***
(2.871)
222.477***
(3.847)
-0.006
(-0.865)

-0.023***
(-6.357)
-0.009
(-1.069)
-0.264
(-0.879)
18.691
(0.219)
0.356***
(12.193)

-0.013***
(-2.818)
-0.023
(-1.181)
-0.998**
(-2.282)
58.653
(0.460)
0.443***
(4.921)

-0.004***
(-2.725)
-0.398***
(-3.583)
-0.068
(-0.537)
60.108***
(8.344)
0.233***
(2.717)

0.011***
(6.951)
-0.188***
(-3.523)
-0.254**
(-2.575)
0.795
(0.231)
0.027
(0.526)

Province fixed
Year
effectsfixed effects
Observations

Yes
Yes
269

Yes
Yes
269

Yes
Yes
269

Yes
Yes
11,610

Yes
Yes
11,506

Population

Note: The sample period for estimations at the central-provincial level and provincial-county level are
1995-2004 and 1995-2005 respectively; t-statistics are in parentheses; GDP per capita is treated as an
endogenous variable and it is instrumented by one-year and two-years lags of GDP per capita; Newey-West
standard error is calculated in the estimations; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

As far as the control variables are concerned, total population is negatively
associated with all types of transfers received, but it is only statistically significant in the
estimations at the provincial-county level. Fiscal deficit in the previous year generally
leads to a higher level of transfers received, particularly for ad hoc transfers and
equalization transfers. The share of rural population and the share of public employees in
the total population appear to have inconsistent signs across the different estimated
equations.
The impacts of fiscal transfers on revenue disparities within provinces vs. across
provinces: Given the results above, of greater revenue disparities within provinces than
across provinces, we are interested to see how the current transfer system may affect the
within and across-province disparities differently. To explore this further, we follow the
previous methods to add own revenues by tax rebates and all other transfers continuously
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at the county level, and then calculate the corresponding Theil indexes to decompose the
overall disparities into disparities within provinces and between provinces.

Figure 4. Impact of Fiscal Transfers on the Decomposition of Provincial Disparities
in Revenues and Expenditures
Note: Figures are calculated at per capita term. Own revenue is added by tax rebate and all other transfers
continuously.
Source: Ministry of Finance and Authors’ Calculation

The results are presented in Figure 4. Three noticeable trends are apparent. First,
both own revenue disparities within provinces and across provinces are reduced by the
transfer system, and the overall equalizing effect is increasing, especially in recent years.
This result contrasts with the general observation in the literature that the transfer system
had not reduced fiscal disparities at the sub-provincial level (Tsui, 2005; Zhang and
Zheng, 2010), but it is in turn consistent with the most recent findings by Wang and Herd
(2013). Second, considering the magnitudes of the effects, the reduction of revenue
disparities within provinces is relatively larger than the reduction in revenue disparities
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across provinces. As shown in Figure 4, even the tax rebates play a minor role in
reducing revenue disparities within provinces; however, they play virtually no role in
reducing the revenue disparities across provinces. 10 Third, revenue disparities within
provinces remain high. Despite the equalizing effects of the transfer system, revenue
disparities within provinces are still more than twice as large as revenue disparities across
provinces.
3.3 Linking expenditure per capita to differences in access to public services
The most important determinant of access and quality of basic public services is the level
of public expenditures. So it is logical that we ask what the relationship is between
disparities in expenditures per capita and disparities in service provision. To answer this
question we look at the evolution over time of disparities in service provision and the
correlation between expenditure per capita and access to service provision. Our focus
here will be on education services.
In fact there is a significant correlation between real per capita provincial
expenditure on education and the intermediate output measure of the ratio of teachers per
1,000 students in primary schools (Figure 5(a)). In addition the dispersion for both
variables, as shown by the coefficients of variation in Figure 5(b), did rise steadily over
the period up to 2005 followed by a fast decline in the subsequent years. It could be that
this change is related to the “province-managing-county” reform introduced by the
central government around that time,11 which meant that some provincial governments
started to directly manage their county governments thus bypassing the prefecture level.
The reversal in trend indicates some convergence across provinces on the budgetary
priority given to this basic service. Nevertheless, with coefficient of variation of 0.8 in
2011, the disparities in education outputs still remain too high.

10
11

Indeed, tax rebates enlarge the revenue disparities across provinces in the early years of the reform.
Using a panel data set of 108 counties in Henan province for the years 1999-2008, Wang et al. (2012)
find that the “province-managing-county” reform reduces local governments’ spending on education.
However, if the “province-managing-county” reform was predominantly implemented in provinces with
originally high education expenditures, then the trend in declining of disparities in education expenditure
across provinces can still be observed.
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Figure 5. Mean and coefficient variation of per capita education expenditure and
number of teachers per 1,000 primary students, 1986-2011.
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and Authors’ Calculation.

4. Options for the Reform of the Current Transfer System
China’s system of intergovernmental transfers has been evolving over the past two
decades, but it has retained its fundamental nature of origin-based shared taxes
supplemented by grants and subsidies for a myriad of purposes and with considerable
redundancy. The end result has been a limited degree of equalization among provincial
and sub-provincial governments and a complex system of transfers by any standards.12
Even though in some functional areas disparities have decreased, overall disparities
across provinces in available per capita fiscal resources and actual expenditures per capita
remain very high by international as well as China’s own historical standards. In this
12

See Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez (2003).
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subsection, we review the main issues of the current system and propose several options
for the possible reforms of the system.
4.1 Additional funding needed from the central government
In terms of the total pool of funds we have seen above that there has been a steady
increase in the dedicated funds, but these have not been enough to reduce the still very
high expenditure per capita disparities across provinces. Thus, the first relevant question
is how much additional funding would be needed from the central government---for
example in some form of equalization grant---to bring the less well-off provinces to the
country average.
There are actually many possible ways to answer this question. A simple but still
quite informative approach is first to select the national average fiscal capacity as the
normative measure of fiscal need for the provincial governments. With this we then can
calculate the increase in the overall pool of funds for transfers required to bring provinces
with fiscal capacity below the national average to the national average. 13 The calculation
of the national average of fiscal capacity can be based on a measure using only “own
revenues” or alternatively using total revenues including transfers from the central
government. Our calculations indicate that these amounts would have been 979,273
million and 933,276 million respectively, based on average values for 2009-2011.14 This
would represent 28.8% and 27.4%, respectively of the total central government transfers
(average values for 2009-2011). Although by no means insignificant these are feasible
levels of additional funding if done over a period of several years.
A significant portion of the required funds could come from a parallel structural
reform granting more revenue autonomy to the provinces; this type of reform would
mostly benefit the richer provinces, but the overall outcome would be a reduction of
intergovernmental transfers especially to the richer provinces, which would benefit the
13

We must emphasize that our simple approach leaves out considerations involving economies of scale
and scope or demographic and geographic characteristics of the provinces. The national standard could
potentially be adjusted by an index incorporating differences in relative expenditure needs and costs of
services.
14 Our calculation procedure is not reported in this paper, but it is available upon request.
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most.15 On the down side, higher equalization transfers would no doubt increase the level
of transfer dependence of poorer provinces. However, the entire policy package—
simultaneously increasing revenue autonomy and redistributing the recipients of
transfers---would make the intergovernmental finance system more equitable by ensuring
that minimum service standards are provided to all citizens regardless in what part of the
country they live. The policy package would also have efficiency benefits by limiting
population migration driven simply by differences in the standards of public service
provision. There are also positive political economy aspects in the package, since both
relatively richer and relatively poorer provinces may perceive themselves as winners.
However, one caution we need to highlight here is that if the additional funding is
distributed through unconditional equalization grants, there is no guarantee that the
additional funds would be spent on essential social services. The strong current incentives
for subnational officials to spend on infrastructure and economic development projects
would remain in place. Because of this, a well-balanced increase in both unconditional
equalization transfers and conditional grants, especially sectoral block conditional grants,
in some particular priority areas of expenditure/services would appears to be a more
balanced desirable way to allocate the additional funding.
4.2 Bringing more certainty to the available pool of funds for equalization
At present the pool of funds available for equalization is decided in the annual budget on
an ad hoc basis. This brings budget uncertainty to the recipient subnational governments
and signals lack of commitment by the central government to the equalization objective,
which may be sacrificed under budgetary pressures. In the international practice this issue
of budgetary uncertainty and lack of commitment is addressed by introducing a (funding)
formula for determining the pool of available equalization funds; one common such rule
is a percent of total tax revenues lagged one or two budget periods. Actually in recent
15

As a matter of fact, our calculation of the transfer dependence (i.e. the ratio of fiscal transfers to total
expenditure) over the past 15 years indicates that the general tendency has been for richer provinces in the
eastern region to become less reliant on transfers, at the same time that relatively poorer provinces in the
central and especially the western regions have become increasingly more reliant on transfers. Given that
there have been practically no changes in revenue assignments in China over the past two decades, it is
likely that these different trends can at least be partially explained by the differing sizes of the regional
economies and their respective rates of growth.
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times the central government has moved toward the formalization of the available pool of
equalization funds by earmarking its share of income tax revenues for equalization. But,
of course, these are only a part of the overall funds currently used for equalization.
4.2 Addressing the fragmentation of conditional grants
Over the last several decades China has followed the path of many other countries around
the world using and abusing the system of conditional grants to address new policy
initiatives, emergencies or old problems that needed fixing. The result has been a
complex and highly fragmented conditional grant system, which imposes high
administrative burdens on subnational governments. The fact that most of these
conditional grants have matching fund provisions had added to heavy budgetary
pressures on subnational governments. To cope with these pressures subnational
governments have used unorthodox public accounting, such as “double-matching” or
using the same funds to comply with the matching provision in different grants.
In dealing with the issue of fragmentation the recent international experience
shows that many countries have consolidated their myriads of conditional grants into a
much smaller number of block grants supporting national sectoral strategies. The block
grants are also conditional—that is, the resources need to be used in a particular sector
but they avoid micro-management by allowing subnational governments more discretion
for the very specific uses. However, these grants tend to provide better balance between
ensuring the use of resources in the pursuit of sectoral objectives and granting subnational governments more budget discretion. Similar reforms could have a high payoff
for China.
4.3 Eliminating the other counter-equalizing elements in the transfer system
Existing horizontal disparities are to a large extent due to several policy choices made
within the framework of the 1994 TSS reform, which were fundamentally counter
equalizing. At the top of those choices was the “tax rebate” which purportedly was
introduced to buy the support of the richer provinces for the 1994 reform. Also of
significant importance was the adoption of revenue sharing on a derivation basis or where
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the money is collected. The implication of the derivation basis is that richer provinces get
to keep more funds because they have tax bases.16
The un-equalizing role of the tax rebate has been reduced over time because by
design the rebate was fixed in nominal terms. Similarly, the un-equalizing effects of the
derivation principle in tax sharing have been reduced because the central government has
increased its sharing rates for certain taxes in recent years. Beyond increasing the pool of
funds available, further equalization could be achieved by changing the allocation of the
shared VAT revenues to a formula based on population. Of course, quite likely the
wealthier provinces would oppose this.
4.4 The need to further formalize the sub-provincial transfer system
Along the lines of a strong federalist system, something that formally China is not,
provincial governments have virtually complete discretion to arrange their fiscal relations
with prefectures and cities, while the latter can do the same vis-a-vis their counties, and
so on. After the 1994 TSS reform subnational governments supposedly restructured their
intergovernmental fiscal relations with lower-level governments. However, the general
perception has continued to be that provincial and prefecture governments do not allocate
funds commensurate to the expenditure needs of lower level governments and that often
they retain funds originating at the center which were intended to reach county and
township level governments.
The question is whether or not subnational governments currently have too much
discretion on how to organize their intergovernmental fiscal relations with their lowerlevel governments. High levels of discretion offer advantages especially in a country as
large and diverse as China. On the other hand, the central government also needs venues
to ensure the attainment of its own policy objectives, such as equalization. Thus there is a
need to find ways to balance flexibility at the subnational level with the ability of the
central government to implement its own policies and achieve its own policy objectives.
16

Merely as an indication, in 2000 just before income tax shares were amended, the nine provinces in the
coastal area (Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Shangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejing, Fujian, Shanghai, and Canton)
collected about 70% of the total income taxes.
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The “province-managing-county” reform has been a relatively recent move in that
direction; but even though this reform has helped to streamline vertical fiscal
relationships, it clearly falls short of reaching the right balance between subnational
flexibility and ensuring national objectives.
Reaching a balance will likely require the redesign of the sub-provincial transfer
system. These reforms actually would closely resemble those needed at the central level:
setting aside sufficient funds for equalization grants, using explicit funding rules to
enhance predictability, and using improved allocation formulas capturing the disparities
in fiscal capacity and expenditure needs of lower-level jurisdictions. All this may require
more central government rules and intervention in the subnational finances. The goal of
granting all citizens access to basic public services quite likely warrants it.
5. Concluding remarks
One of the most significant policy objectives of the Chinese government at the
present time is to move toward a more equal society where all citizens have access to
basic public services regardless of where they live. Despite the efforts until now,
geographical disparities in expenditures per capita still remain too high, implying that
access to basic public services is still too unequal across the country. Going forward and
getting closer to the goal of a more equal and just distribution of services will require
further increasing the overall pool of funds dedicated to equalization and making this
increased funding more stable and predictable by adopting an explicit funding rule for the
available pool of funds. The current allocation formula also could be further improved by
refining the measurements of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.
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